Previous economic experiments on dual-process reasoning in altruistic decisions have yielded inconclusive results. However, these studies do not create a conflict between affective and cognitive motives, resulting in imperfect identification. We interact standard cognitive and affective manipulations in a giving task, and hypothesize that the affective manipulation has stronger effects when we simultaneously put the cognitive system under load. In line with earlier results, we find little evidence for dual-process reasoning in giving. Our independent treatment checks cast doubt on the effectiveness of standard treatment manipulations and show that both cognitive and affective manipulations consistently have opposite effects on the two sexes. We discuss the implications of our findings for economic experiments in this nascent research field.
Introduction
Dual-process theories assert that decision making is comprised of two systems: a slow, deliberative system and a fast, affective system. The evolutionarily older affective system generates mostly unconscious 'gut responses', whereas the younger deliberative system is responsible for conscious and 'rational' decision making. While this strict duality is generally recognized as a metaphor for a more complex modular brain structure (Evans and Stanovich, 2013) , it has been applied fruitfully to core economic domains such as decision making under risk or intertemporal choice (Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2004; Kahneman, 2011) .
Dual-process theories also inform inquiries into the nature of altruism. For example, Moore and Loewenstein (2004) contend that looking out for self-interest is an automatic and primal response, while understanding one's ethical obligations to others is a more conscious process.
More generally, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2004) maintain that while the deliberative system operates on moral and ethical principles of how one ought to behave, the affective system is driven by anything from pure self-interest to extreme altruism, depending on the degree of empathy. Neurological evidence supports application of dual-process models to altruistic behavior, indicating that brain areas associated with affective and cognitive decision making both matter for altruistic decisions. 1
While the dual-process framework has been used to organize experimental findings on sympathy and caring (Loewenstein and Small, 2007) , the results of studies that investigate the role of cognitive factors in altruistic behavior are mixed and inconclusive. A common approach is to suppress the role of the deliberative system by placing the decision maker under cognitive load, so that behavior more strongly reflects the goals of the affective system. For example, Schulz et al. (2014) find that players in the role of dictators are somewhat more generous under high cognitive load. However, Hauge et al. (2014) do not find any difference and Cappelletti et al. (2011) find no effect of cognitive load on proposer behavior in an ultimatum game. Kessler and Meier (2014) find that the cognitive load can increase charitable giving, but that the effect is not robust to small manipulations. 2 1 Moll et al. (2006) finds that both affective and cognitive parts of the brain are active during the process of charitable giving. Sanfey et al. (2003) shows that activity of a part of the brain often associated with emotions (the anterior insula) correlates with rejections of unfair offers in the ultimatum game, while a part associated with cognitive activity (the prefrontal cortex) is active with acceptance and rejection of such offers. While these are correlational studies, Knoch et al. (2006) use magnetic stimulation to deactivate (part of the) prefrontal cortex and finds that this leads to more acceptance of unequal offers in the ultimatum game.
2 Studies that use response time to proxy for cognitive reasoning are similarly inconclusive. Piovesan and Wengström (2009) finds that subjects who decide faster are more selfish in a modified dictator game. Cappelletti et al. (2011) finds that proposers in ultimatum games offer more under time pressure, but argue that this is due
We address two pitfalls that may contribute to the lack of clarity on the role of dual-process reasoning in giving behavior. The first is that without exception, studies in this literature manipulate only the cognitive system. This should lead to variation in behavior only when the cognitive system and the affective system have conflicting goals (Skitka et al., 2002) . If both systems approximately "agree" on the right amount of giving, which may well be the case in the rather abstract dictator games that are the focus of the literature, manipulations of the cognitive system will not result in different decisions. This may explain why previous studies have found no clear results from such manipulations.
To address this concern, we conduct a charitable giving experiment in which we manipulate both systems in a 2 × 2 design. Our manipulation of the deliberative system is a standard cognitive load task where participants have to remember a string of numbers (Gilbert and Osborne, 1989; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999) . The affective system is manipulated by the display (or not) of vivid images of victims helped by the charity under consideration, which is a standard way to induce affect in the psychology literature (e.g Olofsson et al., 2008) and draws on research on the identifiable victim effect . This design allows us to study whether the cognitive system constrains the affective system, where we hypothesize that the affective manipulation has stronger effects when the cognitive system is under load.
The second pitfall is that economic experiments that vary cognitive load typically do not evaluate whether the manipulations actually affect reasoning capabilities. In this study, we provide two independent checks of our cognitive load manipulation, a "cognitive reflection test"
(CRT, see Frederick, 2005 ) that participants complete under load, and an opportunity for participants to revise their giving decision after cognitive load has been lifted. In addition, we study the impact of our affective manipulation by eliciting emotional ratings from a separate group of participants in both affect treatments.
We do not find statistically significant effects of our treatment manipulations. Consistent with some of the papers cited above, we find that cognitive load does not change behavior when affect is low. Contrary to our expectations and the evidence on the identifiable victim effect, our affective manipulation also has little effect on donations in both the high or the low load treatment.
When we look at the checks of our cognitive load manipulation, we find no evidence that it has an effect on aggregate CRT scores or completion time. However, we find that cognitive load affects men and women differently: whereas men perform better under high load, women perform worse. A gender effect also appears in the ratings on our affective manipulations, where to strategic considerations. Rand et al. (2012) and Rand (2013) find that faster subjects are more cooperative across a range of games, although at least some of these results have been criticized (see Tinghög et al., 2013; Recalde et al., 2014) .
we find that men and women react in opposite ways to being shown images of victims. This may explain why women actually donate more under high affect, while men donate less, resulting in a gender gap under high affect. Small et al. (2007) also investigates both affective and deliberative processes using a 2 × 2 design. However, that study is not designed to separate the two systems, and some of the treatment manipulations may affect both the deliberative and the affective system simultaneously.
For example, in one treatment information about an identifiable victim is given at the same time as statistical information about the charity is withdrawn. In our design, the affective manipulation is designed to convey no relevant statistical information about the charity. Furthermore, our manipulation of cognitive load is closer to the standard practice.
A closely related, but hypothetical and not incentivized, study by Skitka et al. (2002) Our study adds to the literature not only by featuring real-stakes, incentivized decisions, but also by independently manipulating both systems and by examining independent or behavioral assessments of the manipulations. Our results raise important concerns about the study of dual-system theory and altruism in the economics laboratory. Even standard manipulations may fail to produce the intended effects, or may produce them only for some sub-groups in the population. In addition, we call for caution regarding literal interpretations of dual-process decision making models.
Design
We asked participants to make a donation decision to a charity, independently manipulating the cognitive and affective systems across treatments. Participants had the opportunity to donate to the German Red Cross (GRC) programs that provide aid to victims of conflict in Syria. The timing of the experiment was as follows. After reading basic instructions on an introductory screen, participants advanced to a screen displaying information about the GRC programs in Syria. The text was adapted from the GRC website and described the victims of the conflict, the activities of the GRC, and how the activities help the victims. When reading this information, the participants had not yet been informed that they would be asked to make a donation to the GRC.
A third screen introduced the cognitive manipulation, which consisted of a rather standard numeric recall task. Participants were given a number and told that on two subsequent screens they would be asked to add a single digit (first 7, then 8) to the number and keep a running total in their head. This total was to be reported later in the session. Participants were not allowed to write or use electronic devices so this running total had to be calculated and stored in participants' memories.
In the Low Load treatment the starting number was 13, yielding interim and final totals of 20 and 28. The starting number in the High Load treatment was 13987, yielding interim and final totals of 13994 and 14002. Our procedure implements a small variation of the standard design where high load typically implies memorizing a single six or seven digit number. A slightly shorter number will avoid that participants quickly "give up" if they forget the number early on, and the recurrent addition task means participants need to engage with the memory task throughout the experiment. Like Kessler and Meier (2014), we did not provide financial incentives for this recall task to avoid creating a disparity in income effects across experimental treatments.
On the fourth screen, participants were given an endowment of e10 and asked to choose how much of it to donate to the GRC, which constitutes our main variable of interest. The donation choice was made by selecting an amount from a menu of choices, enumerated whole euro amounts, from e0 to e10. Above the donation-choice menu, participants were asked to add 7 to the number they were shown on the previous screen and remember the running total, thus extending the cognitive load manipulation.
We took two measures to asses the effectiveness of the cognitive-system manipulation. First, on the fifth screen, took a version of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) and were also asked to add 8 to the running total in their head. Our version of the CRT consisted of four questions. Lower CRT performance in the High Load treatment would be consistent with an effective cognitive manipulation. After the subjects completed the CRT, they advanced to a screen where they were asked to input the memorized number. Participants then completed a brief questionnaire, the purpose of which was to collect basic demographic information and to return them to a more neutral cognitive state.
After the cognitive load had thus been lifted, we applied our second check of our cognitive manipulation, by giving subjects the (unexpected) opportunity to revise their donation decisions.
Larger and more frequent revisions in the High Load treatment would be consistent with and 5 effective cognitive manipulation.
The affective manipulation consisted of displaying images chosen to increase empathy for the conflict victims and willingness to donate to a charity that helps them. In the High Affect treatment, three screens (the GRC-information screen, the donation screen, and the revised donation screen) featured evocative images of victims and aid workers in areas affected by conflict in Syria. The four images that were identical on all screens, were chosen to elicit affective responses without providing additional information about the conflict victims or the charity. They were displayed on the charity information screen, the donation screen, and the donation revision screen. In the Low Affect treatment, no images were displayed on any screens.
The experiments took place at the Frankfurt Laboratory for EXperimental economics (FLEX)
at Goethe University Frankfurt. Subjects were randomly recruited from the FLEX subject pool using the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2003) and received a show-up fee of e2. Participants made their decisions on individual computer terminals and the interface was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Screenshots containing the instructions (in German) can be found in Appendix 5, followed followed by an English translation of the instructions. We conducted 12 sessions, each lasting about 25 minutes and with 12 to 23 participants each, for a total of 224 participants. The average donation was e4.07, so the average subject took home e7.93, including the e2 show-up fee.
Hypotheses
We base our hypotheses on the model in Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2004) , which gives a rather literal interpretation of the dual-system approach. The authors argue that the affective system and the cognitive system both have an optimal level of giving that may differ between the two systems. If the two optima differ, then the resulting donation level will lie somewhere in between. The degree to which the cognitive system will be able to influence the decision away from the 'affective optimum' towards the 'cognitive optimum' depends on contextual factors, such as the degree of depletion of the cognitive system or and the presence of other tasks that require cognitive attention.
Unlike previous research, this experiment features not only a cognitive manipulation, but also a manipulation designed to increase the level of giving desired by the affective system. The use of pictures to evoke affect is standard in social psychology Olofsson et al. (2008) , and is designed to increase pity and compassion. Moreover, focusing on individual victims can increase giving through 'the identifiable victim effect', which is typically associated with the affective system (see Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small et al., 2007) . We thus hypothesize that High Affect will increase the amount of giving favored by the affective system, which leads to higher donations 6 both under High Load and under Low Load.
Moreover, under High Load, the deliberative system has less capacity available to influence the decision away from the 'affective optimum' than under Low Load. Thus, we hypothesize that the increase in giving resulting from the use of pictures of victims is larger under High Load than under Low Load. In other words, under High Load, we expect the 'whims' of the affective systems to be have a more powerful influence on behavior than under Low Load.
Results
Of the 224 participants, 53 percent identified as male, 52 percent identified Business or Economics as their field of studies, 12 percent were first-time participants in FLEX laboratory experiments, 72 percent had previously participated in three or more experiments, and 29 percent reported that they give money to charity "often" or "from time to time. Figure 1 shows mean donations by treatment in Panel 1a. Table 3 in Appendix A summarizes the descriptive statistics. As is apparent from the figure, differences in mean donations are small, and a series of two-sided Mann-Whitney U (MWU) does not reject the null hypothesis that the donation distributions are the same when comparing any two treatments. Table 1 presents the result of a multivariate analysis. In column 1, we include dummies for the two treatment conditions as well as their interaction. In the second column, we include some controls relating to the cognitive skills and/or effort that subjects displayed. "CRT Score" is the number of correct answers in the CRT test, and "Correct recall" is a dummy that is one if the subject correctly solved the load task. Since both variables may interact with the size of the cognitive load, we include interaction variables. In the third column, we add controls related to gender and their interaction with the treatment variables. Overall, we find no statistically significant effects. The only exception is the interaction between gender and affect, which we will discuss in more detail below.
Analysis by Gender
Although we did not initially hypothesize this, we the multivariate analysis points towards the existence of gender effects. Descriptive statistics for giving by gender are provided in Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A. Comparing giving rates between gender (and across treatments), women contribute on average 88 cents more than men ($4.54 vs. $3.66), a difference which is significant at 5% in a t-test (p = 0.02).
On closer inspection, it appears that the gender difference is due to different reactions to the pictures of victims displayed in the High Affect treatment. Panel 1b of Figure 1 shows the effect of the affect manipulation by gender. The sexes respond in opposite ways to high affect: while women increase their donations, men decrease them. Pooling both cognitive load treatments, the mean giving numbers when affect is high are $4.91 for women and $3.38 for men. A MWU test rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions between men and women under high affect at the 1% level (p = 0.0048). This result also underlies the marginally significant negative effect of affect for males under high affect in the regression (see Table 1 , column 3).
Effectiveness of the Treatment Manipulations
Given the absence of aggregate treatment effects, one may ask if our treatments actually manipulated something. In this section, we provide evidence from our independent evaluations.
Because we observed a gender gap in donation rates, we look at the effect of the manipulations both on aggregate and on both sexes separately.
Effectiveness of the Cognitive Manipulation
Before we consider the effect of cognitive load, we first study if participants took the task seriously. To do so, we investigate accuracy with which participants reported the number they were asked to compute and remember. The rate of successful recall was was 0.88 (98 out of 112) Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 We now turn to the two features of the design that allows us to assess the effectiveness of the cognitive load manipulation. First, we compare participants' performance on the CRT test between the High Load and Low Load treatments. In both treatments, the average number of questions answered correctly was 1.60 out of 4, so on the basis of performance we cannot reject the possibility that the manipulation was ineffective. Note that this goes against the evidence in Johnson et al. (2014) , who find that load, implemented by a variations in a different memory task does decrease CRT performance.
Second, we examine the total time that it took subjects to complete the four CRT questions.
In the Low Load treatment participants took on average 94 seconds to answer the questions, while they took on average 103 seconds in the High Load treatment. This difference of 9 seconds (10%) is not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.115, t-test). The absence any aggregate difference in performance and completion time casts doubt on the idea that subjects were affected by cognitive load.
Disaggregating CRT performance and speed by gender reveals a divergent response to cognitive load. In addition, we judge the cognitive manipulation by evaluating how subjects revised their decisions after cognitive load was lifted. 5 The average participant revised her donation downward by e0.38 and 34 percent of participants made a non-zero revision. While 26 percent in the Low
Load treatment chose to revise the original donation amount, this increased to 42 percent in the High Load treatment. Figure 3a shows the fraction of subjects who revised their decision by gender and by cognitive load. Revision rates are higher in the High Load treatment for both sexes, consistent with the idea that reflection is impaired in this treatment. However, while this increase is significant for women (p = 0.016, Fisher Exact Test (FET)), it is not for men (p = 0.417, FET). Figure 3b shows the average the size of revisions by gender and cognitive load treatment.
Downward revisions are more extreme on average in the High Load treatment (e0.48) than in the Low Load treatment (e0.29), consistent with the idea that high load impairs decision making. Again, we see that women respond to higher load with a higher average revision size whereas men don't, although these effects don't reach conventional significance levels for either sex.
. 5 Note that in the High Affect treatment the images shown before and with initial donation choice were also provided in the revision screen, so that the affect treatment was maintained. Of course, one might speculate that seeing the same pictures another time does not have the same effect, so that the role of affect was weaker, but we have no way of verifying this. In sum, there is some conflicting evidence that the cognitive load treatment was effective.
We find evidence that participants took the memory task seriously, but this does not result in difference in average test results across load treatments. Furthermore, we find that impact of the cognitive load treatment differed across gender. Women performed more poorly and slowly on the CRT when given the High Load task, but men actually improved slightly. Revision rates are higher for women under High Load.
Effectiveness of the Affect Manipulation
The absence of an aggregate effect of the affective manipulation on the initial giving decision raises the question whether the affective manipulation had the intended effect of increasing the level of giving preferred by the affective system. Furthermore, the divergent donation responses of male and female participants to the display of vivid images emphasize the need to better understand how the response might vary across subgroups within our sample.
To do so, we elicited affect ratings from participants in other, independent sessions. 6 Participants in these sessions thus only reported their feelings and were not asked to make any donation. They were presented with the same information screen about the GRC as in the main experiment and shown the same vivid images of the conflict in Syria in the High Affect treatment, but not in the Low Affect treatment.
On the next screen, participants completed a six-item Likert scale pertaining to their feelings about victims of the conflict in Syria and the GRC programs assisting those victims. The scale featured six levels of agreement or disagreement and did not include a neutral option. The six items consisted of the following statements:
1. I feel pity for the victims of conflict in Syria.
2. I feel sympathy for the victims of conflict in Syria.
3. I feel compassion towards the victims of conflict in Syria.
4. I feel an obligation to help victims of conflict in Syria.
5. I should do more to help the victims of conflict in Syria.
6. I approve of the GRC's programs in Syria.
On a final screen, participants completed the same questionnaire as in the donation experiment.
Ninety participants in ten sessions completed the affect ratings. Of these, 44 percent identified as male, 31 percent identified Business or Economics as their field of studies, 17 percent were first-time participants in FLEX laboratory experiments, 51 percent had previously participated in three or more experiments, and 42 percent reported that they give money to charity "often"
or "from time to time. For each item, we mapped responses to numerical scores from one to six, with one corresponding to strong disagreement and six corresponding to strong agreement. For each individual we summed these scores over the six items, yielding a total affect score with a range of 6 to 30.
The overall average affect score was 20.4 with a standard deviation of 5.6. and approval (p = 0.056, MWU). Furthermore, under High Affect, women have higher scores than men in all dimensions, except for "Help" and "Sympathy" where the scores are virtually tied. Overall, the data show that a display of vivid pictures has a weak positive effect on women's affect across the board, with more pronounced increases in pity and compassion. For men, the opposite is true, as affect ratings go down in most dimensions, specifically the approval of the charity's activities.
While our data do not provide any evidence as to why men and women exhibit opposite reactions to the images, we offer two conjectures. First, men may be more prone to perceive the pictures as 'emotional blackmail' designed to make them give more, and thus react negatively to them. While this can explain the effect we observe on donations, this explanation is not relevant to the behavior of the participants making the affect ratings, to whom we made no mention of donations. Second, the images of foreign victims may trigger group identity and men are known to act less positively towards out-group members than women (Winterich et al., 2009) .
Discussion and conclusion
In this study we used two standard procedures from psychology in order to manipulate the cognitive and affective system in a giving task. We do not find aggregate effects of these manipulations. We do find substantial gender effects, with women responding positively to our affect manipulation and men responding negatively. Similar findings emerge when we use independent measurements to study the effect of our treatment manipulations. We find no aggregate effects, but we find opposite effects for both sexes. Women's cognition suffers under cognitive load, but not men's. A display of vivid pictures raises women's affective ratings but generally lowers men's.
To us, these observations suggest reason for caution for the nascent field of dual process research in economics. The effects of even standard treatment manipulations are subtle and may depend on unanticipated details. In the case of cognitive load, we are strengthened in this belief by the increasing number of studies that find conflicting or null results from this manipulation (see introduction). For example, Kessler and Meier (2014) find that the effect of cognitive load manipulations depends on whether the manipulation was implemented early or late in the experiment. To this, we add that manipulations may have different effects on different subgroups. In our experiment, gender shows up as an important variable to look at, but it is entirely possible that there is an effect of education level or or age, of which there was little variation in our study.
We believe these considerations also have implications for the way that researchers approach the dual-system model. As psychologists and neuroscientists have long realized, this model is a metaphor for a much more complex interaction of different distributed modules in the brain.
Despite the popularity of this dual-system metaphor, there is an ongoing debate about the cogency of its different variations and its usefulness for scientific practice (e.g. Keren and Schul, 2009; Evans and Stanovich, 2013) . We share the concern of Evans and Stanovich (2013) that casual assumptions about two systems of information processing may fail to advance or even harm our understanding of reasoning.
Thus, we believe that researchers will increasingly need to go beyond the simple dichotomy implied by the dual process model. While our current state of knowledge may not yet permit such a strategy, the ultimate aim will be to look for treatment manipulations that more directly target different brain structures (Fehr and Rangel, 2011) .
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics. 
